

[Free download] Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War

# Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War

*John Ellis*

*ePub | \*DOC | audiobook | ebooks | Download PDF*



#1004598 in Books Viking 1990Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 20.00 x 20.00 x 20.00l, #File Name: 0670807737643 pages | File size: 63.Mb

**John Ellis : Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War:

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. a fantastic workBy Enrique BozzoThis book is the ultimate -until now, at least- on the numerical part of WW2. A fantastic effort to put all this information together, and a sobering information that forces two questions upon us:1) How could Germany endure so much and so long in the face of extraordinary shortages and numerical inferiority?2) Why didn't the Allies win much sooner, thus saving innumerable lives on both sides?The answers are not easy, and beg for our own further research, no doubt into the political field.13 of 14 people found the following review helpful. The Axis never had a chance!By Bill PilonI just finished John Ellis' magnificent Brute Force. Ellis' thesis is that the key factor in the Allies victory over the Axis powers was primarily the result of overwhelming economic power which they were able to apply to the battlefield with their immense industrial potential.Ellis' book is replete with examples and statistics that prove his point, including a fairly comprehensive set of charts and table in the appendices that are worth the price of admission all by themselves. The result of all this is, to this reader at least, utterly convincing.In addition to proving his central thesis, Ellis provides several interesting insights in the balance of his work, not the least of which was that the average rate of mortality among Bomber Command aircrew actually exceeded the mortality rate of Kamikaze pilots! Another interesting finding is that the level of motor transport necessary to fully supply Rommel's Afrika Korps at the end of its 900 mile supply line from Tripoli

would have required the Wehrmacht to commit roughly 75% of all the trucks it possessed, leaving the forces on the Eastern front more or less immobile. I recommend it very highly to pretty much anyone who wants to gain some insight into the results of WWI. If you're interesting in WWII, you've pretty much got to read this book. 10 of 11 people found the following review helpful. Good but is it still current? By Michael Reese Like Ellis "THE SHARP END OF WAR" this book is easy to read and provides a lot of insight into what I would call the "historical variation of WW2" which is the Germans didn't have a chance of winning. The book also points out this fact didn't lead to a quick or painless end of the war but to a long road to Berlin and Tokyo despite the Allies' overwhelming material and manpower superiority over the Axis, and our ability to read the German and Japanese codes (ULTRA vs. Germany) so in many cases we knew exactly what the Germans were doing and what their forces were and how they were deployed. Despite this the Allies made many mistakes that in the author's view extended the war and Allied lives. Highly Recommended.

The noted military historian John Ellis argues in this masterly study that the Allies triumphed not because of superior leadership, strategy, or tactics—but solely on account of their endless industrial capacity.

From Publishers Weekly Ellis's argument, backed with statistics, is that the Allied victory in WW II was the inevitable consequence of enormous advantages in manpower and materiel, but that the deployment of this overwhelming force was so maladroit that the war dragged on longer than necessary. In his lucid summaries of the major campaigns (Blitzkrieg, Battle of Britain, Eastern Front, Battle of the Atlantic, Bomber Offensive, Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, Pacific) the author is highly critical of the conduct of Allied operations, charging British General Bernard Montgomery, for instance, for overcautious tactics, and RAF Marshal Arthur Harris with "insane insistence" on area bombing. Ellis (Cassino: The Hollow Victory) contends that the U.S. Navy ignored the speediest and most cost-effective way to defeat Japan, choosing to squander resources in the Central Pacific instead of strangling the country economically by severing its access to the raw-material deposits in the East Indies. The book's pragmatic interpretation is convincing, and fundamentally changes the received wisdom about WW II. Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Library Journal Ellis (Cassino: The Hollow Victory, LJ 6/1/84) has matured from military reporter to serious combat analyst. In this sober but readable study he concludes that the wartime triumphs of the Allies were due less to their battlefield skills than to their enormous industrial capacity. In all World War II combat theaters, he argues, Allied tactics on the ground, sea, and air were crude and wasteful, dependent upon abundant firepower rather than training and finesse. This viewpoint is not new, but Ellis buttresses it with formidable statistical proofs that will be grist for countless future debates. He freely overstates his case, possibly for emphasis, and greatly overpraises the Germans, but his basic premise is well and forcefully presented. Highly recommended to public as well as academic collections. - Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.