


(Download free pdf) Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Campaigns and Commanders Series)

Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Campaigns and Commanders Series)

Michael R. Matheny

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#699626 in Books Michael R Matheny 2012-06-16 2011-04-01 Original language: English PDF # 1 9.00 x .85 x 6.00l, 1.20 #File Name: 080614324X360 pages Carrying the War to the Enemy | File size: 66.Mb

Michael R. Matheny : Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Campaigns and Commanders Series) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Campaigns and Commanders Series):

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Nuts and bolts on thinkingBy Thomas E. JohnsonThe work covers

the development of Operational level thinking and planning in the US military, showing that it has a long history (back to the Civil War), but concentrating on the interwar and World War II periods in detail. I would regard it as essential reading for anyone who seriously studies American planning and operations for that period. 4 of 4 people found the following review helpful. timely history

By david l. poremba This is a history of the "operational art" as it developed in the United States Army from the early 1880's to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Operational art, when used effectively by commanders, turns tactics into strategic victory. It is generally agreed that modern operational art developed during the interwar years (1919-1939), in Germany and the Soviet Union, not in the United States whose emasculation of its armed services when peace arrives is well known. What is not so well known or studied is the role played by the army and navy educational systems after graduation from the academies. In 1881, General William T. Sherman ordered the establishment of the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. By 1907, this school had expanded into the School of the Line and the Army Staff College. The Army War College, at the top of the system, opened in 1904. The US Navy opened its War College in Newport, Rhode Island in 1904 as well. Matheny discusses how officers and instructors at these colleges studied and interpreted the American experience in World War I. Their thoughts on joint and combined operations would lead to success in World War II. Matheny cites four major examples of successful combined operations: the invasion of North Africa, 1942, Operation Torch; Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, 1944; General Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines in 1944; and, Operation Iceberg, the 1945 invasion of Okinawa. These successful ops put the US on the same level of efficiency as the Germans. The author goes on to say that the beginning of nuclear warfare led the US to ignore operational studies, much to its detriment in Vietnam. This is a timely, well-written book with a huge relevance on today's battlefield. 1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Highly Recommended, Mostly Concerns Amphibious Warfare

By John Hamill This is an excellent, well written, and one of a kind book on an unusual topic. Although it has been said that the US military neglected operational thought prior to and during World War II, the author instead shows that they excelled at joint operations, particularly amphibious warfare. He shows how the US developed war colleges where theory was developed, scenarios were wargamed, and the services learned to cooperate effectively. This cooperation was unique in the world at the time and was developed to suit America's unique position of "carrying the war to the enemy" - in places far from home. As a result, logistics were stressed in the US military much more so than in other nations. The author points out, for example, that German army staff organization stressed operational planning over logistics, which resulted in good battlefield performance that was often counteracted by disappointing and unexpected supply difficulties. The flaws in the book are few - and mainly ones of omission. The type of operational thought like that found in Germany and the Soviet Union - that of large armies on a large land mass - is covered only in passing. The author does mention the US Army's belief that wide flanking movements were necessary because of mechanization - but he does not discuss the validity of this line of thinking, why it was developed, or its implications. Could this line of thinking be related to the US Army's unwillingness to mass tanks like the Germans or give tanks heavier armor and bigger guns? Also, the author does not attempt to explain how an army so focused on logistics failed so miserably to continue its advance into Germany in the fall of 1944. Perhaps the concept of "phasing" that he discusses was a limitation mentally - or perhaps it was simply a failure to appreciate just how quick mobile warfare could become. Overall, the book presents a rosy view of the US military of the time and a rosy view of the military and naval schools prepared the commanders in World War II for the unprecedented war that they fought. In other respects not discussed, a rosy view is NOT justified in my mind. Overall, this book is excellent and will give you a new and refreshing view that you will not find elsewhere. I highly recommend it.

Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of "operational art," the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art. Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled—and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II. Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II. After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue

modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries.

Matheny fills a vacuum in military historiography with this book, while reminding us that great victories are not won by accident.”—Military History