


(Mobile book) Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

## Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

*Williamson R. Murray*

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**Williamson R. Murray : Military Innovation in the Interwar Period** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Military Innovation in the Interwar Period:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Much Information and many AnalysesBy Patrick C. RoeThis books contains examples and analyses of innovations which have changed the conduct of World War II. For any career military person understanding how new devices and new idea cause the evolution of tactics, operations and strategy is fundamental to understanding military art. It is the basis on which the tactical doctrine is built. That being so, and since this book consists of ten different essays by six different authors, it is a crying shame that both the best examples and the best analyses are scattered here and there through the book. Never the less a dedicated student will dig out the

pearls. The obvious pearls in the book are the RAF's development of an early warning and a fighter direction system, the U. S. Navy's development of carrier operation, and the German development of what came to be called the Blitzkrieg. The German armor successes were actually an innovation based on an innovation. Early in World War I the Germans began developing, and training troops, in the "infiltration attack," a method in which small groups, squads, advancing by fire and maneuver, and bypassing strong points for following troops to deal with. It was the method Ludendorff used to accomplish a limited breakthrough in the 1918 offensive. It was the method that Von Seeckt established as the basic infantry tactic of the Reichwehr in the post war army. Replacing the squads with tanks was the innovation that created the Blitzkrieg. It took the Allied armies, including our own, another twenty years to adopt both innovations. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Great Read, in-depth study

By Vince Frausto This book was written as a study to draw attention to the decisions at the various levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic) that led to success and failure of those countries involved in WWII. Before reading this book I would watch WWII movies wondering why certain tactics were not being utilized. Well, this book answers many of those questions and a whole lot more. Great Read, in-depth study, and well researched as it provides invaluable insight of how innovation influenced operations on land, in the air, and at sea.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. Analyzing Military Innovation

By Retired Reader Perhaps the most important insight this book offers is that military innovation is considerably more complex than simply building better mouse traps. The authors clearly demonstrate that the research, development, testing and evaluation (RDTE) process needed to create a new or improved military system is only the first step in a complex process. For such a military system to be effective, there must be corresponding changes in the tactical and strategic doctrines, training, and organizational structures that reflect the capabilities and limitations of the new system. The history of military innovation in the twenty year period between WWI and WWII then is a complicated one filled with successes, failures, missed opportunities and brilliant theorizing. To begin with few soldiers really believed that WWI was a "war to end all wars" as did some of the more idealistic politicians of the time. They therefore began a scramble to understand the lessons and innovations that were the result of that war. Within the ground forces serious efforts were made to understand the implications of mechanization, especially armored fighting vehicles (AFV) and motor transport, for a future war. In a similar manner the air forces struggled to understand the demonstrated capabilities of the airplane for close ground support, air superiority, and most importantly strategic bombing. The navies of the world had to struggle with the role of submarines in future wars as well as the challenges and opportunities of naval aviation as represented by aircraft carriers, float planes and the need for long range reconnaissance. All services were deeply affected as well by the clear utility of wireless radio and soon other electronic breakthroughs. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book is titled, "Assault from the Sea" which really concerns the efforts by the U.S., Japan, and to a lesser extent the UK to develop the doctrines, technology, and organizational structure to conduct large scale amphibious warfare. In this case the examples from WWI served only as the starting points for some very original work. And it was the U.S. Marine Corp that took the lead in this work, in spite of severe fiscal restraints. In spite of some weak spots this book provides valuable information on the thinking of the military and civilian visionaries of the principal participants of WWII as they attempted to build modern military forces.

In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This 1996 study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organisation and styles of operations.

"Alan Beyerchen's essay on German, British, and American work on radar is alone worth the price of the book and is a splendid demonstration of how a cultural and scientific historian can make a major contribution to military history. The description of how culture, organization, and strategic predicament shape a military's reception of a new technology is simply brilliant." Foreign Affairs

"Military Innovation in the Interwar Period offers detailed insights into how to proceed with today's revolution in military affairs. Those who find themselves today in the same position as Moffett, Towers, Liddell Hart, and Dowding did seventy years ago will want to study this book very closely." E.G.Hoffman, Naval War College

"This volume should make a big impact on American military academies and staff colleges, and would also make a good graduate course reader for students who have a reasonable foundation in the otherwise daunting historiography." Brian Bond, The International History From the Back Cover

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About the Author  
Allan R. Millett is a specialist in the history of American military policy and twentieth-century wars. He is the founder of the internationally renowned military history program at the Ohio State University, where he is Mason Professor of History Emeritus. Millett currently directs the Eisenhower Center for American Studies at the University of New Orleans, where he is the Ambrose Professor of History and serves as the Senior Military Advisor for the National World War II Museum. He is the author or co-author of eight books and co-editor of five others.