


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Moscow Station

Kessler

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Kessler : Moscow Station before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Moscow Station:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy Robert Glenn LynchAmazing book0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Four StarsBy Carlos FerreroA very good book11 of 12 people found the following review helpful. Did KGB use Marine scandal to protect Ames and Hanssen?By J. MartensA must read for espionage buffs. Aldrige Ames and Robert Hanssen appear destined for a high ranking among twentieth century American

traitors, and Kessler unwittingly wrote an essential book for anyone attempting to understand how hard the KGB worked to keep them hidden. Don't expect great literature, though; it's low-quality muckraking. The style mixes clumsy soap opera schmalz with wooden detective story descriptions. In describing Sergeant Lonetree's entrapment by a female KGB agent, Kessler writes: "Her soft, gray eyes seemed to hold the promise of all the love he missed as a child." (page 114) We also learn that the KGB is housed in "forbidding headquarters". Kessler's thesis is clear: "In the end, it was NSA that found the chilling evidence - the sinister devices in the CPU (the Communications Program Unit, or metal shack housing the embassy's secure communications equipment) that showed that the KGB had penetrated the code room and had been able to read all of the embassy's communications." This evidence was "Corroborated by secret information from defectors and a rash of executions of CIA assets." (page 18) Wait a minute! Hasn't the US government since blamed Ames and Hanssen for the executions of CIA assets? A close read of Kessler's text shows that the CIA and NSA never agreed that the code room was bugged. Kessler simply calls that a cover up. (page 254) Now that we know about the spying of Ames and Hanssen, which was discovered after the book was written, it seems that the CIA and NSA were right, and Kessler was wrong. The Ames and Hanssen revelations make Kessler's willingness to assign guilt so quickly seem vicious and petty. Kessler's bad guys -- usually State Department officials and the Marine guards -- now appear to be victims of circumstances. The American Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur Hartman, leads the list of Kessler's bad guys. Kessler forces him into the mould of a B-grade movie caricature of an effete, bumbling diplomat. "The thought of going without a Soviet driver for his Mercedes made Ambassador Hartmann shudder." (page 12) "Hartman's preference for Soviet employees over Americans played nicely into the KGB's hands." (page 114) Regional Security Officer Klingensmaier comes off no better: "Klingensmaier had no backbone." (page 84) Kessler skewers the CIA for tolerating an atmosphere at the American embassy that was conducive to treason and the Naval Investigative Services for failing to convict the guilty Marines. Kessler's Epilogue, which was meant to spark the reader's outrage that guilty parties went unpunished, now reads like a list of American careers, mostly those of the Marine guards, ruined by the treachery of Ames and Hanssen. In this light, the defection of Vitaliy Yurchenko becomes a fascinating moment. Yurchenko was "the highest-ranking KGB officer ever to defect", and he revealed to the US the identities of 12 people spying for the USSR, including the Americans Edward Lee Howard and Ronald W. Pelton. He also informed the CIA that its secure communications in the Moscow embassy had been compromised. Then, Yurchenko redefected back to the USSR. (Kessler blames CIA bungling for the redefection.) At the same time another KGB defector informed the CIA that Marine security guards had been successfully recruited. It now seems reasonable to conclude that Yurchenko defected to spread disinformation about compromised embassy communications as a way of distracting attention from Ames and Hanssen. After all, the Soviets still needed to arrest their own spies and take countermeasures against the US actions revealed by Ames and Hanssen. The Marine guard scandal seems part of this well-planned KGB ruse. Kessler's book spreads this KGB disinformation. Why? Was he working for "US", trying to convince the Soviets that U.S. security agencies bought the Soviet story while they hunted for moles. Or, was he working for "THEM"? Once again the espionage world becomes smoke and mirrors. My guess is that he just sought to cash in on the scandal.

A probing look at how Soviet agents managed to infiltrate the U.S. Embassy and steal top-secret codes reveals the alarming official neglect of American security from the ambassadorial level down

From Library Journal This is all you wanted to know about the lurid Marine, spy, and sex scandal that has recently rocked the American embassy in Moscow. After the antics of the poor, young, single, not-too-bright, and not-well-trained Marines sent to guard the Embassy, the Marine motto of *semper fidelis* ("always faithful") just won't be the same. Critics have said that Kessler, author of *Spy Versus Spy* (LJ 9/1/88), theorizes beyond his evidence. But that is not the central point. The description of the laxity about security, the demoralizing conditions of the Marines and embassy staff, and the dimwitted Washington bureaucracies in charge of these things is the real story, and on hearing it one doesn't know whether to laugh at the Get Smart atmosphere or to cry. A neat if somewhat padded expose.- H. Steck, SUNY Coll. at Cortland Copyright 1989 Reed Business Information, Inc.