


(Mobile book) Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History

Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History

John David Lewis

*ePub | *DOC | audiobook | ebooks | Download PDF*



[Download](#)

[Read Online](#)

#1231991 in Books Lewis John David 2013-12-26 2013-12-26 Original language: English PDF # 1 9.21 x .93 x 6.14l, 1.25 #File Name: 0691162026368 pages Nothing Less Than Victory Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History | File size: 76.Mb

John David Lewis : Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. something amiss By fred debrostoo bad lewis died. i fully subscribe to most. it would have lent strength to juxtapose our longest war, the war against the pirates of the coast of barbary, that should have ended like the marines planned in total unconditional surrender of the paschas once and forever , instead ended in a gloriously written peace agreement in 1805. here we are 200 years later bombing the sons of the ottomans, isis at the very same spot we stopped in 1804, sirte, with our most moden weapons, b2's. the casus belli ist unchanged: piracy and kidnappings, evil. in between lie 200 years of incessant wars from atatuerk to rommel and eisenhower and hillary clinton.....incredible. but wait, theres more: carthago and the punic wars, then the visigoths....i think libya has been plowed over for centuries by swords and bombs and tanks. and there is no end in sight....nothing unless we get total unconditional victory there! i hope victor davis hansen completes that book! 1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Has the idea of "Victory" been forgotten? By Michael Hagan With no real end in sight in the War on Terror, the "new normal" of constant deployments and unending conflict is a condition that the majority of the military has come to accept. Is there a better way? In a wide survey of history beginning with the Theban Wars (382 BC) and culminating with the successful occupation of Japan (1945), John David Lewis argues that protracted warfare is never a necessity, but rather a result of flawed strategy and political failure. War is always quick when fought with proper objectives and aimed at the enemies ideological center of gravity. "The lives of soldiers and civilians depend upon clear statements of the objectives to be achieved and a commitment to create the resources necessary to prevail," Lewis argues. "Without clearly stated, rational objectives," war becomes "a circular process of bloodshed rather than a goal-directed offense, and military victories on the battlefield [become] irrelevant to the outcome..." Lewis explains that in all of his examples, aggressors launch wars "bent on loot, conquest, or slaves" and that the defenders were unable to act as long as they failed to properly identify the threat. In fact, the defenders "abetted the slaughter as long as they failed to confront the true source of the attacks. Once they did, the battle and the conflict turned quickly in their favor." Dr. Lewis is a visiting associate professor of philosophy, politics, and economics at Duke University. He draws on over 2,000 years of Western History to demonstrate the need for quick, decisive victory. For example, in 208 B.C. the Romans had been invaded by Hannibal, and lost during every attempt to oppose him directly. The Roman leader Quintus Fabius implemented a defensive strategy where towns were evacuated and burned that were in the path of Hannibal. Only this scotched-earth policy of "Fabian-delay" could manage Hannibal despite placing Roman civilians in the situation of having to accept an invading army on their soil indefinitely. This situation went on for 15 years with no hope of resolution in sight when Scipio Africanus finally developed a solution. He brilliantly overcame the false alternative of either accepting the roaming enemies on his soil verses launching ineffective attacks against Hannibal. Scipio decided to raise an army and launch a quick, decisive attack against Carthage itself. This resulted in Hannibal rushing back to Carthage to defend his homeland, and an ultimate Roman victory at Zama which ended of the war and established a lasting peace. Although Lewis does not state the parallels, it is impossible not to see the relationship between our current "fortress America" of metal detectors and color-coded security warnings, and the situation the Roman's found themselves in during Hannibal's invasion when "an entire generation of Romans grew used to a foreign army on its home soil." In one of the most compelling chapters, Dr. Lewis launches what is probably the most systematic ethical defense of the nuclear bombing of Japan ever written. Citing the projected casualty figures of the planned ground invasion of Japan, the suicidal last-ditch defense planned by Japanese Leaders, the fact that the Japanese-- not American soldiers-- were responsible for the war, and a myriad of other factors, John Lewis contends that the use of Atomic bombs was the only moral and practical course of action. Lewis explains that "the complete loss of hope was central to Japan's decision to surrender" and that only a demonstration that "Americans were willing and able to remain offshore and bomb Japan into the bedrock" could result in an immediate end to the war. Military readers will come away with a better grasp of history, and will be compelled by the argument that war can only be won with a decisive attack on the enemy's ideological, political, and social center of gravity. "These wars were fought by commanders who were oriented toward solid objectives and who used flexible strategies to pursue firm goals with an inflexible will..." summarizes Lewis. "Each struck to the center of his enemy's strength, and achieved a physical victory that extinguished the moral and ideological fire behind the fight." 1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Wonderful substance, must-read for lovers of history; sloppy digital conversion (?) (Kindle Edition) By Fabian Bollinger I thoroughly enjoyed the substance of this book, and indeed it greatly helped me make up my mind about the proper conduct of warfare. The lesson, that moral ideas are to be taken seriously as a/the major cause of human events, is of incalculable value to any student of history, whether he is interested specifically in affairs of war, or not. Nothing else will adequately explain how, time after time, a seemingly inferior force can achieve overwhelming strength; whether it be the ancient Greeks successfully standing up to a ridiculously stronger Persian army, or Germany going from a defeated nation with no military to speak of, back to being the dominating power in Continental Europe, able to set the world ablaze once more within a span of barely twenty years. Much as I loved the substance of the book, however, I must criticize the often sloppy conversion in the Kindle edition, which I read. (At least I hope the same errors aren't in the print edition!) Words are missing, spaces within a word where it is obviously unintentional, typos abound. For just one concrete example: the ultimate conclusion of the book, in its last sentence, misspells the Latin phrase: "Sic [sic!] vis pacem, para bellum" - it is, of course, supposed to be "si". 4 stars because the sloppy editing

ought not to keep any lover of history from appreciating the substance of this book, but needs to be remarked upon nonetheless.

The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. Nothing Less than Victory provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat. Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy--as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace. Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, Nothing Less than Victory makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.

From Publishers Weekly Thanks to its recent experience of quagmires that drain into simmering truces, America has forgotten that triumph is the proper way to end a war, argues this brash study of military blowouts. Surveying six conflicts, from the Persian invasion of ancient Greece to WWII, historian Lewis (Early Greek Lawgivers) contends that lasting peace requires a shattering victory, a display of overwhelming force that expose[s] the physical and ideological bankruptcy of the losers and precipitates an immediate collapse in [their] will to fight. Lewis's analysis of war as a psychological struggle and clash of moral purposes is lucid and forceful; it's especially telling in his incisive account of Sherman's march through Georgia, and especially provocative in his defense of the atomic bombings of Japan. (To break the Japanese leaders out of their ideological blinders... American leaders needed to kill a lot of Japanese in a visibly shocking way.) He's less cogent when he tries to distill profound moral purposes from the murk of the Second Punic War or Roman emperor Aurelian's squabble with Queen Zenobia of Palmyra. Lewis's tight yoking of military success with moral superiority sometimes veers close to the notion that might makes right. (Mar.) Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. "Lewis' analysis of war as a psychological struggle and 'clash of moral purposes' is lucid and forceful; it's especially telling in his incisive account of Sherman's march through Georgia, and especially provocative in his defense of the atomic bombings of Japan."--Publishers Weekly From the Back Cover "John David Lewis offers a superb appraisal of how ancient and modern wars start and finish. This chronicle of some 2,500 years of Western history is replete with a philosophical analysis of why nations fight, win--and lose. His insights and conclusions are original and fearless--as well as timely and welcome in the confused war-making of the present age."--Victor Davis Hanson, author of Carnage and Culture "This book's argument is powerful and provocative, and Lewis is a good storyteller and scholar. Ambitious, stimulating, and thoughtful, this book makes a strong case for the value of the strategic offensive, and engages with the kind of problems that everyone should be thinking about today."--Barry Strauss, author of The Spartacus War