


(Library ebook) On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815

## On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815

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**Carl von Clausewitz, Arthur Wellesley 1st Duke of Wellington : On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815:

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful. Taking Waterloo Study a Step HigherBy J. SpolerDifferences in language have obscured and confused Waterloo scholarship ever since the battle. National pride and its reciprocal biases have alsostood in the way of obtaining a comprehensive understanding of Napoleon's final campaign. A lack of reliable translations of primary sources hasdogged historians since the mid 19th century. In many ways, the problem is

still nagging us today. Enter Bassford, Moran and Pedlow with their eminently readable translation of Clausewitz's thoughts on the Campaign of 1815. Clear-headed, professionally dispassionate, and even handed, Clausewitz clearly understood the intricate entanglements of politics and war-making. He never loses sight of the political imperatives that forged the policies and strategies of Napoleon, Wellington, Blucher and Gneisenau. His critiques of the commanders' behavior during the campaign were carefully phrased, but still managed to rankle the Duke of Wellington, who took exception to Clausewitz's daring to explain Wellington's motives. Wellington responded with his only essay on the battle, and it is here coupled with the Prussian's chapters on Waterloo. Wellington's cold dismissal of Clausewitz's speculations, particularly about Wellington's deployment of his multi-national forces before the campaign, comes clearly off the page, frost and all. We also sense Wellington's defensiveness regarding his reputation and place in history as well as his all too easy rejection of Prussian claims. But there is also his grudging admiration for a needed job of history well done. What I think Pedlow et.al. have given us is a detailed study of an intuitive military mind (Wellington) versus a rigorously analytical mind that believes there is an art and science to war (Clausewitz). Despite the presence of the sniping, the two pieces, taken together, give the serious student of Waterloo much to think about. This is historical material written after considerable reflection by two men who were there. That both were geniuses of a sort, gives their arguments ballast and impact. This book was a fine idea, made better by the essays the three editors wrote for it. After you have read the first round of general histories of Waterloo, after you have puzzled over maps and asked yourself why and how a hundred times, you are ready for this book to put it all in perspective. Huzzah for Bassford, Moran and Pedlow. 1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Good adjunct to "On War" By Al This was an extremely interesting look at the Battle of Waterloo from the perspective of Clausewitz, who was a staff officer with the Prussian army during the battle. The counter point is provided by the Duke of Wellington, and the contrasting views were of additional interest based on how the battle was viewed at different levels. Even with these two views, the whole of the battle can only be partly understood. It is clear in Clausewitz' narrative that he is using this narrative as an attempt to refine his theories, as well as achieve a deeper understanding of the events. As Bassford states in the introduction, Clausewitz saw theory as a means for providing the framework for analysis and judgement. The editors did an outstanding job in organizing Clausewitz' text, as well as the letters between members of Wellington's ring and Wellington's response to Clausewitz' analysis. Footnotes are kept to a bare minimum, and only used as a means to amplify points in the text. This is a terrific adjunct to "On War" and well worth the time to read. 0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. excellent book By Curtis S Interesting perspectives on Waterloo -- maps were ok but could probably be improved upon -- recommended for those who are already familiar with the battle

This book at last makes available a penetrating exchange between two of history's most famous soldiers concerning the dramatic events of the Waterloo campaign of 1815. The Duke of Wellington is considered one of the greatest military commanders in British history; General Carl von Clausewitz is often seen as the greatest military thinker in the history of Western civilization. Both men were prominent participants in the campaign of 1815. Wellington commanded the Anglo-Allied army, while the much younger Clausewitz was chief-of-staff of the Prussian 3rd Corps. Wellington went on to become prime minister of Great Britain and commander-in-chief-for-life of the British Army. Clausewitz went on to write *Vom Kriege* (On War), a seminal and still hotly debated treatise on the theory and philosophy of war. Via the works of his disciple, military historian Hans Delbrück, he also became the founder of modern, "scientific" military history. Despite considerable interest in Clausewitz in Britain and America, Wellington's once-famous response to Clausewitz was largely ignored by historians of Waterloo writing in English after 1914, and no efforts were made to publish a translation of Clausewitz's original campaign study before this project was launched in the 1990s. Hence the importance of this book's examination of the exchange of ideas between these two famous soldiers. It contains Wellington's official 1815 report on the battle of Waterloo; two of Clausewitz's post-battle letters to his wife; previously unpublished correspondence within Wellington's circle discussing Clausewitz's work; a completely new translation of Clausewitz's strategic analysis of the entire campaign (including for the first time the rare maps to which he refers); Wellington's detailed 1842 essay--the only serious essay Wellington ever wrote on the subject--responding to Clausewitz's analysis; and analytical essays by prominent experts on Clausewitz, Wellington, and Waterloo. This book makes clear the importance of grasping the views of these two famous participants and will be of great interest to readers wishing to learn more about the Battle of Waterloo, the campaign of 1815, the development of Clausewitz's thinking on war and military history, Clausewitz's evaluation of key command decisions, and Wellington's reactions to Clausewitz's analysis and criticisms.

About the Author CHRISTOPHER BASSFORD, a former U.S. Army artillery officer, is Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC. He is the author of *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945* (Oxford University Press, 1994) and *The Spit-Shine Syndrome: Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988). He is also one of the editors of the Boston Consulting Group's business-oriented *Clausewitz On Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist*

(New York: Wiley, 2001). As a US Marine Corps doctrine writer, he authored MCDP 1-1, Strategy and MCDP 1-2, Campaigning (both 1997). He is the internet editor of The Clausewitz Homepage. DANIEL MORAN is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is co-editor with Peter Paret of Clausewitz's Historical and Political Writings (Princeton University Press, 1992). Recent works include The People in Arms (co-edited with Arthur Waldron, Cambridge, 2003) and Wars of National Liberation (Harper-Collins, 2006). GREGORY W. PEDLOW served as Chief of the Historical Office at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Mons, Belgium, from 1989 until his retirement in 2015. He is the author of The Survival of the Hessian Nobility, 1770-1870 (Princeton University Press, 1988); The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1956-1962 with Donald E. Welzenbach (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998); NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969 (NATO, 1997); and articles on 19th-century Germany, NATO and the Cold War, and the Waterloo campaign of 1815.