


(Pdf free) Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler against Stalin

## Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler against Stalin

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**From Casemate UK Ltd : Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler against Stalin** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler against Stalin:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Five StarsBy russell beckerGreat stuff. Russ14 of 18 people found the following review helpful. Political CorrectnessBy Sepp DietrichDuring and since WW 2 the Soviets (and Russians) have claimed that the Germans and her Axis partners were far stronger than they were and that the Soviet forces were smaller than they were in actuality. The Russians also use statistics which make it appear that their losses were smaller than they actually were. Bergström uses G.F. Krivosheev's SOVIET CASUALTIES AND COMBAT LOSSES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY which exhibits many problems. Christer Bergström has taken this same position and it is no coincidence that he also has taken the position praising the Soviet system of socialism. Not that he

necessarily comes from a socialist country (Sweden) since two other others are, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, whose book THE DRIVE ON MOSCOW 1941 is first class and which he cites in his footnotes and bibliography. Bergström has also taken the position that the Germans committed war crimes from the first day of the campaign and that the Soviets were merely taking revenge by murdering captured German soldiers when captured. There is another work which I would recommend which is Craig W.H. Luther's BARBAROSSA UNLEASHED which Bergström does not use or cite but which he should have. Bergström is consistent in that he cites only Red Army forces at the front and not those in reserve thus making it look as though the Germans had a quantitative superiority which in actuality they did not possess. All the problems and errors in Bergström's work cannot be cited here due to lack of space but a few will suffice. On page 99 the author claims that the heavy KV tanks of the NW Front wiped out an entire task force of the 1st PzD south of Leningrad. He cites Paul Carell's UNTERNEHMEN BARBAROSSA which in turn uses Rolf Stoves' DIE 1. PANZER DIVISION which I have. What does Bergström mean by task force? The U.S. Army would define it as a reinforced battalion at its smallest. The fact is that the KV tanks overran the 1st company's 37 mm anti-tank guns (of Pz Jäger Abteilung 37). What Bergström does not tell us is that the 150 mm howitzer gun crew of Obergefreiter Georgi of 9./AR 73 destroyed 12 KV 1 and 2. Bergström's motive is to make the Russians look good. In the cauldron battles of Kiev and Bryansk-Vyasma, Bergström accepts Krivosheev's statistics of Russian losses instead of the German counts of POWs taken and Bergström claims that the difference is that the Germans counted civilians taken prisoner. I think the Germans could tell the difference between a soldier and a civilian, especially if the former were wearing a uniform. Krivosheev's work has many problems and he claims that the casualties of the Red Army at Bryansk-Vyasma in killed and captured were 514,338 between 30 September and 5 November 1941 whereas the Germans claimed 673,000 POWs with Bergström claiming the difference was in civilians apprehended. While Bergström uses the work of Zetterling as a source, Bergström completely ignores the evidence that Zetterling used to show that the Red Army in October 1941 sustained 959,200 casualties of which 855,100 were killed and missing, this being more in line with the German claims of total captured. Bergström simply cannot be trusted when it comes to Russian statistics. One last example of military error will suffice. When the Soviets counter-attacked west of Moscow on 6 December, Bergström cites the discredited Klaus Reinhardt report that Army Group Center had 1,929,409 men. AGC had an actual strength of 962,982 men according to Zetterling while the total manpower strength of the German Army on 1 December 1941 was 2,112,002. Russia had a tremendous reserve of manpower. According to Luther, the Red Army had 5.4 million on 22 June (which Bergström never mentioned); 6.9 million on 31 August; and 8 million on 31 December 1941. With such odds, the German Army could not win. The German mobile forces needed also a first-class road system which the USSR did not possess since most of its roads were dirt. Thus in one sense, the defective socialist system of the USSR contributed to their victory. One last word will be on the war crimes. It is politically correct to refer to Germany (and her allies) when it comes to war crimes and ignore those of the Allies. Bergström concentrates on them and excuses and minimizes those of the USSR. He claims that Germany began to commit war crimes at the beginning of the campaign and that the Soviets' only motive was revenge. He claims that 15% of Germans captured by the Soviets died in their captivity. He cites the claim of Russia that only 356,700 died of the 2,388,443 German captured. Luther states that 1.1 million Germans actually died. The very first war crimes were committed by the Soviets on the first day of the campaign. Bergström cites Major Wolfgang Schellmann, C.O. of JG 27, who collided with the I-16 which he had just shot down and he bailed out, to be captured and interrogated by the NKVD. He was executed that same day which the author does not mention. The same can be said of every Luftwaffe crewman and pilot who was brought down over Soviet territory. The only survivors were those who evaded capture and returned to German lines. Those captured by the Russians never returned after the war to Germany. It can be safely stated that around 50% of crew survived being shot down and those captured were executed. The same can be stated of soldiers who were captured. Many were found later by advancing German forces and the autopsy showed that they had been tortured most brutally before being killed. It can be factually stated that almost 100% of German servicemen who were captured in the first two years were killed. Stalin realized after Stalingrad (where only 6000 returned to Germany after the war of 91,000 captured ) that Germans captured could be used as slave labor. This excluded the wounded who would need medical care and could not immediately work who were executed on the spot where they were found. Bergström does not cite the excellent three-volume work of Professor Franz Steigler who documents Soviet war crimes against Germany in the first two years of the campaign. There are areas that Bergström never covers. Stalin ordered the Soviet military and civilians on 3 July to destroy everything German and not take prisoners. He also ordered a "scorched earth" policy to destroy everything, towns, equipment, food, etc. which could not be taken with the retreating Russians. Thus, by destroying the food that would be needed by civilians in the future and by German troops, he condemned his own people to malnutrition and starvation in the future. Bergström never mentions the crimes of Stalin against his own people during the war. It is estimated that he had around one million killed each year and one does not know how many returning POWs were punished and killed. The British returned many back to the USSR who did not wish to return including those who had fought for Germany. Their fate is ignored because it would be politically incorrect to do so. 19 of 20 people found the following review helpful. A good book with some issues By kim worsch Just finished this new book by renown ww2

author Christer Bergström (The Ardennes, 1944-1945: Hitler's Winter Offensive and a large number of Luftwaffe books). The book is about Operation Barbarossa and takes place from before the invasion to the Soviet counteroffensive in December 1941. The text is well-written and easy to read, and the author does a great job of interweaving his research from various other historians, primary sources, with many letters and diary entries from soldiers and officers from both sides. Added throughout the book are info boxes dealing with relevant, but more detailed topics. The author is not afraid to draw conclusions, but always makes clear why he has drawn the conclusions that he has. Mr Bergström have in my opinion demolished some older "myths" about Barbarossa, for example that the so called Siberian reinforcements helped save the Soviet side during the winter battles and why Hitler made the decision to stop Heeresgruppe Mitte halfway through Barbarossa. In addition to the text, the book also includes quite a few pictures and a few detailed maps all in black and white. Annexes and footnotes are also very extensive. I miss the excellent color profiles of tanks and aircrafts that usually comes with Mr Bergström's other books. To explain the rather few stars in my rating I must highlight some criticisms, most of them I've haven't encountered in the author's previous works. 1) A large portion of the text is focused the Air war, both in the broader sense but also in the more personal stories. This is maybe no coincidence given the author's previous background dealing with the Air war on the Eastern front in numerous books. But here in a more general coverage of Barbarossa it takes an almost overwhelming space. To his defense the author explains again and again that the air forces on both sides had an extremely important role to play and were often pivotal in securing victory when used and defeat when absent from the ground forces. 2) A lot of the above mentioned info boxes and large portions in the main text are about the holocaust and genocide operations on the eastern front (Einsatzgruppen, NKVD, OUN-B, Ghettos...). This of course is a subject that cannot be overlooked even in a strictly military work like this. But as the book is only about 300 pages long (The Ardennes book is about 500 pages) and have the aspiration on being "One of the foremost reference work on Operation Barbarossa" too much information on the military operations are left out. Also the war at sea receives minimal cover and the operations by Germany's allies, except Finland that gets her own chapter, are hardly mentioned. 3) The photos are of mixed batch both quality wise and also from a factual stand. There are many very good pictures but throughout the book I find overly dark, grainy and pixelated ones that could have been easily been left out with no negative consequence for the book. The captions are mostly good but sometimes a little brief like "A destroyed I-153". I'm used to Mr Bergström's other works and a hallmark of his was outstanding picture quality and detailed and relevant captions. I've also noticed some factual errors in the captions where tanks have been miss identified. (on p.221 a KV-1 is described as a T-26) for example. And on the front page (English edition) there is a soviet antitank gun with crew members wearing shoulder boards, something not introduced till 1942 at the earliest. 4. There are some typos and errors found in the text. IMO the author's previous works didn't have any of this and let me believe there have been a somewhat rushed proofreading/printing process. To be honest this review deals with the Swedish edition and I don't know how the English ed. proofreading looks like.

Operation Barbarossa was the largest military campaign in history. Springing from Hitler's fanatical desire to conquer the Soviet territories, defeat Bolshevism and create 'Lebensraum' for the German people, it pitted two diametrically opposed armed forces against one another. The invasion began with 4.5 million troops attacking 2.3 million defenders. On one side was the Wehrmacht, without any doubt the world's most advanced military force. On the other were the Soviet armed forces, downtrodden, humiliated, decapitated and terrorized by an autocratic and crude dictator with no military education whatsoever. Initially Operation Barbarossa led to a row of unparalleled tactical victories for the attackers. In just five months, an area of around 1.4 million square kilometres was captured. Tremendous losses were inflicted on the Soviet armed forces. 566,852 troops were listed as killed in action, 2,335,482 as missing in action (including POWs), and around 500,000 Soviet reservists had been captured while still mobilizing - making a total of approximately 3.4 million total losses. But by the end of December 1941, Operation Barbarossa had ground to halt; how was this possible? Christer Bergström tells the story in great detail; as with *The Battle of Britain: An Epic Conflict Revisited* he combines facts and figures with the human stories behind the action, and draws new conclusions based on many years of research in German and Russian archives.

"...a tour de force on operation Barbarossa and all of its facets...Where this new rendition goes beyond all others in its field is where the author challenges, and proves, many of the items that we take as gospel in the earlier histories, and shows them to be false. Some of these myths are about the mass surrender of Soviet soldiers and the disparity between the casualties suffered on both sides. The book is a treasure trove of information about subjects that have never before been brought to print. It goes deeply into the partisan and anti-partisan part of the war. The author does not shy away from the many ugly facts about this time in history. He goes into detail about the Nazi 'cleansing' and the amount of cooperation that the Nazis received from some of the indigenous populations. There is even a part of the book that goes into the amount of rapes committed by the German soldiers. The author also shows in detail that the Axis armies actually outnumbered the Russian forces on June 22 1941....The text with all of its tons of details of the day to day operations and human involvement is without a doubt the best covering of this campaign in print. " (Wargamer's

Needful Things)"...Takes on the conventional 'wisdom' boldly; good photos; well organized; unafraid to confront German and Finnish atrocities; boldly states the Nazi goals in eastern Europe; very readable/accessible...This book will get you thinking, especially if you have not read some of the more recent scholarship on the eastern front. If you like a good dose of history alongside your models this is an excellent book. It is easy enough for a first-time student of the eastern front, but thoughtful enough for those who have done extensive reading. Bergstrom is better at posing important questions than he is at answering them. I found myself thinking this book is the beginning of several debates, not the end. (Armor Modeling Preservation Society)...Bergstrom offers far more verifiable facts about far more facets of the war. In particular, he quotes specific numbers of tanks, troops, casualties, aircraft, victories, losses, and more. Where sources disagree, he generally points out and attempts to reconcile the differences. Instead of simply providing the same old rote outline of operations, he explains how plans evolved as the campaign progressed. He observes the workings of headquarters and troops on both sides of the front, balancing the views from Moscow and Berlin. His account also fully integrates air operations with events on the ground. ...Many excerpts from firsthand accounts ... His final section, "The War of Annihilation" forcefully brings home the horribly murderous aspects of the war that can be too easily forgotten in strictly military works. The state of the art has come a long, long way since Hitler Moves East in 1964. Operation Barbarossa 1941: Hitler against Stalin is one of the results of that progress in scholarship, bringing better accuracy, balance, and clarity to the old story.... (Stone Stone Second World War Books)About the AuthorChrister Bergström has published 23 books on World War II. He specialises on World War Two and in the past has focussed on the Eastern Front. Previous bestsellers "The Ardennes" and "Battle of Britain" sold over 3,000 copies within six months.